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ALCOHOL ADVERTISING BANS AND ALCOHOL ABUSE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the effect
on alcohol abuse of banning broadcast advertising of alcoholic
beverages. The effect of a ban cannot be studied using data from
one country because the adoption of new advertising bans is an
infrequent event and requires many years for adjustment. However,
an international data set can be used since there is considerable
variation in the use of advertising bans across countries. The data
used in this study are a pooled time series from 17 countries for
the period 1970 to 1983. The empirical measures of alcohol abuse
are alcohol consumption, liver cirrhosis mortality rates, and
highway fatality rates. The cultural factors which influence
alcohol use are measured by sets of country dummy variables. The
empirical results show that countries with bans on spirits
advertising have about 10 percent lower alcohol consumption and
motor vehicle fatality rates than countries with no bans. The
results also show that countries with bans on beer and wine
advertising have about 23 percent lower alcohol consumption and
motor vehicle fatality rates than countries with only bans on
spirits advertising.
Henry Saffer
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I. Introduction
Participants in several recent meetings of the World Health
Organization have expressed concern over the worldwide increase in
alcohol marketing efforts. The reason for this concern is the
presumption that the increase in alcohol marketing efforts will
lead to an increase in alcohol consumption and alcohol abuse.
Broadcast advertising is a major component of alcohol marketing.
According to Cavanagh and Clair1nonte (1985) alcohol advertising
expenditures in the United States were about one billion dollars
in 1980. These expenditures represent about two percent of all
advertising expenditures in the United States and about one half
of all alcohol advertising in the world. Although expenditures on
alcohol advertising are substantial, the effect of this advertising
on alcohol abuse remains a controversial subject.
The central issue in the debate over alcohol advertising is
whether this advertising affects only brand choice or affects both
brand choice and overall alcohol consumption. A number of
econometric studies of alcohol advertising expenditures find little
or no effect of advertising on total alcohol consumption. Studies
of advertising expenditures include Coinanor and Wilson (1974),
Grabowski (1978), McGuiness (1980), and Ornstein and Levy (1983).
Smart (1988) reviews several other studies, including both
econometric and experimental studies, and finds little evidence of
any effect of alcohol advertising. Simpson et. al. (1985) also
review the literature on alcohol advertising and conclude that2
there is no evidence of any effect of alcohol advertising on
aggregate alcohol demand.
One problem with prior empirical studies of alcohol
advertising expenditures is the use of data measuring relatively
small variations in alcohol advertising. This type of data may be
useful for measuring the effects of alcohol advertising on brand
choice but can not be extrapolated to measure the effect of alcohol
advertising on total alcohol consumption. An empirical strategy
designed to test the determinants of brand choice is not
appropriate for problems involving total alcohol consumption since
these choices are fundamentally different.
Total alcohol consumption decisions are guided by perceptions
of traditionally acceptable patterns of consumption. Traditional
patterns of consumption are important because alcohol is an unusual
consumer good. Alcohol is unusual in that its consumption has an
important and historic role in many social customs, while it is
understood to also have potentially adverse health effects.
According to Strickland (1983), drinking behavior is learned by
observing the behavior of family and peers, and is reenforced by
advertising portrayals. The perception of traditionally acceptable
patterns of alcohol consumption is a result of accumulated exposure
to positive and negative information about alcohol. Changes in
current advertising exposure can have only a limited influence on
an individual's cumulative information about acceptable usage.
Small variations in alcohol advertising expenditures might,3
therefore, effect brand choice decisions but not effect total
alcohol consumption decisions.
Continuous exposure to alcohol advertising over a long period
could influence cumulative information about acceptable usage
patterns and thus effect total alcohol consumption. An alcohol
advertising ban is an ideal empirical indicator of cumulative
information about alcohol. This suggests that a cross sectional or
time series study of advertising bans is an appropriate empirical
strategy for testing the effect of alcohol advertising on alcohol
abuse. Prior studies of alcohol advertising bans include Smart and
Cutler (1976) and Ogborrie and Smart (1980). These studies examine
the effect of advertising bans in British Columbia and Manitoba,
respectively. The ban in British Columbia included all alcohol
advertising but lasted only one year. The ban in Manitoba included
only beer advertising and was analyzed using an eight year time
series. Both studies concluded that these advertising bans had no
effect on alcohol consumption. Alternatively, these results may
indicate that in a single province or country study a long time
period is necessary before there is any observable change in
alcohol consumption.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the effect
on alcohol abuse of banning broadcast advertising of alcoholic
beverages. The focus on an advertising ban is particularly
important because a ban is a likely choice of public policy for the
control of alcohol advertising. The data set used in this study is
a pooled time series of data from 17 countries. The independent4
variables include measures which indicate whether alcohol
advertising is allowed or banned. An international data set is the
only way to measure the effect of a ban on alcohol advertising.
Data from one country cannot be used since changes in alcohol
advertising bans within countries are rare and the imposition of
a ban requires an extended period for consumption to adjust. There
is, however, considerable variation in the use of advertising bans
across countries.
II. Empirical Framework
Consumer demand theory provides the conceptual framework for
the empirical models. To develop the demand for alcohol, assume
that an individual's utility depends on the consumption of alcohol,
the consumption of other goods, and taste.' Maximizing this utility
function subject to an income constraint yields a demand for
alcohol function. The theory predicts that the price of alcohol
will have a negative effect on alcohol consumption and that income
will have an uncertain effect on alcohol consumption. Alcohol
'Consumers actually buy specific brands of beer, wine, and
spirits rather than alcohol. This could be modeled as a three stage
process with alcohol selected in the first stage, beer, wine, and
spirits selected in the second stage, and specific brands selected
in the third stage. According to Walsh (1982), in the second stage
this process imposes the constraint that the marginal rates of
substitution between the three alcoholic beverages are independent
of expenditures on non-alcohol goods. In the third stage, this
process imposes the constraint that the marginal rates of
substitution between specific brands of each type of beverage are
independent of expenditures on other types of alcoholic beverages.
This model emphasizes the distinction between the consumer's
decisions about overall alcohol consumption and decisions about
specific brands.5
advertising enters the individual's demand curve as a determinant
of taste. Aggregation of this demand function over individuals
results in an empirically testable demand for alcohol function.
Since the purpose of this paper is to measure the effects on
alcohol abuse of a ban on alcohol advertising, empirical measures
of abusive consumption of alcohol are necessary. Bruun et al.
(1975) conclude that data which measures mean alcohol consumption
in a population group is proportional to the level of abusive
alcohol consumption in that population. However, Duffy and Cohen
(1978) conclude that there is significant variation in the
distributions of alcohol consumption across populations. This type
of variation would make mean alcohol consumption a biased indicator
of abusive alcohol consumption.
Because the validity of mean alcohol consumption as a measure
of alcohol abuse is unresolved, the liver cirrhosis mortality rate
and the motor vehicle fatality rate are also used as empirical
measures of alcohol abuse. In a summary of clinical studies of
liver cirrhosis, Cook and Tauchen (1982) conclude that the
probability of death from liver cirrhosis is directly related to
lifetime alcohol consumption and body weight. Current liver
cirrhosis mortality rates reflect both current levels of abusive
consumption and the trend in drinking in the past decade or two.
In a summary of studies on motor vehicle accidents, Donelson (1988)
concludes that approximately 50 percent of all fatal motor vehicle
accidents in the United States involved alcohol. Donelson also6
concludes that the probability of a fatal motor vehicle accident
increases exponentially with alcohol consumption.
Neither mean alcohol consumption, the liver cirrhosis
mortality rate nor the motor vehicle fatality rate is a perfect
measure of abusive alcohol consumption. However, a consistent
statistical relationship between alcohol advertising bans and each
outcome measure would be evidence of a behavioral relationship
between alcohol advertising and alcohol abuse.
Since three dependent variables are used to measure the effect
on alcohol abuse of banning alcohol advertisements, three separate
equations must be estimated. To estimate the effects of alcohol
advertisements on liver cirrhosis mortality rates and motor vehicle
fatality rates, two probability functions are assumed. These
equations relate the probability of death to an individual's
alcohol consumption and a vector of other variables.2 Substitution
of the alcohol demand equation into each probability equation
yields reduced form probability equations. Each reduced form
relates the probability of death to the variables that determine
alcohol demand.
III. Data
The data set used in this study is a time series of cross
sections consisting of 17 countries for the years 1970 through
2These equations can be called production functions because
they define the relationship between inputs of alcohol consumption,
and other conditions, and the output of mortality rates.7
1983. The 17 countries are members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD countries were chosen
because they have attempted to maintain a data base of comparable
economic and social data since 1960. The member countries of the
OECD are also the most developed free market countries in the
world. The data set was limited to 17 countries because of the
availability of data. The data set begins with 1970 and ends in
1983. Table 1 contains summary definitions and mean values for all
the variables.
The first dependent variable used in the regressions is per
capita annual consumption of pure alcohol in liters. These data
come from the International Survey of Alcohol Beverage Control
Polices published by the Brewers Association of Canada (BAC). The
variable is computed by adding together the per capita consumption
of pure alcohol in beer, wine and spirits. The data are based on
different assumptions, by year and country, about the percent of
alcohol in each beverage.
The other dependent variables are the liver cirrhosis
mortality rate and motor vehicle fatality rate. The liver cirrhosis
mortality rate was computed by dividing the annual number ofliver
3Price and income are reported in units of national currency
and must be standardized using purchasing power parities. The OECD
reports purchasing power parities for the member countriesbased
on 1980 survey data. Although reliability diminishes withdistance
from the sample year, purchasing power parities can be estimated
for earlier years using inflation rates. The first year of the data
set used in this study is 1970 since 1970 is as far back as the
OECD estimates purchasing power parities. The last year of the data
set is 1983 due to the time lag in reporting data.8
cirrhosis deaths by population. Similarly, the motor vehicle
fatality rate was computed by dividing the annual number of motor
vehicle fatalities by population. Liver cirrhosis deaths and motor
vehicle fatalities are reported in the United Nations (UN)
Demographic Yearbook. The population data were taken from the OECD
National_Accounts.
The dependent variables have been transformed into logarithmic
specifications. The alcohol consumption variable was transformed
into the natural logarithm of consumption. This functional form is
often used in demand studies. Because of aggregation, these
regressions are weighted by n112, where n is the population of the
country. Since the liver cirrhosis mortality rate and motor vehicle
fatality rate have restricted ranges, a logistic specification will
conform to the data more closely than a linear specification. The
logistic specification is most easily achieved by transforming both
rates to ln(M/1-M), where M is the rate and ln is the natural
logarithm. Maddala (1983) shows that the appropriate weight for
this transformation is: [nM(1-M)J1.
In defining the empirical measure of advertising bans, two
generalities in the laws emerge.First,all advertising
restrictions group beer and wine into one category with spirits
4cirrhosjs deaths of people under thirty are generally not
caused by alcohol abuse. However, cirrhosis deaths are not
available by age. Since total cirrhosis deaths are used to compute
the cirrhosis death rate, total population is used as the divisor.
Also, only about 50 percent of highway fatalities involve alcohol.
However, total highway fatality data are used since there are no
objective estimates of the number of highway fatalities involving
alcohol.9
treated as a separate category. This restriction applies to all
countries included in this study. There is no country in the data
set which allows spirits advertising but prohibits beer and wine
advertising. This reflects the widely held opinion that spirits
consumption is potentially more dangerous than beer or wine
consumption. Second, bans on alcohol advertising are the same for
both television and radio, with print media treated as a separate
category.5
Two dichotomous alcohol advertising ban variables have been
defined. One variable measures bans on spirits advertising and the
other measures bans on beer and wine advertising. The spirits
advertising ban variable is equal to one if a country has a ban on
broadcast advertising of spirits but allows beer and wine
advertising and is otherwise equal to one. The beer and wine
advertising ban variable is equal to one if a country has a ban on
broadcast advertising of beer and wine and is equal to zero
51n the United Kingdom spirits advertisements are not
televised but may be broadcast on radio. The Brewers Association
of Canada also reports that, in Austria, advertisements for spirits
are allowed on the radio but not on television. Since television
is the more important advertising media, and since only one spirits
ban variable is empirically feasible, the U. K. and Austria have
been coded as banning broadcast advertising of spirits. In
addition, Portugal and Spain have restrictions limiting the times
that alcohol advertising can be broadcast. Spain also has increased
costs for alcohol advertising. In Scandinavia, light beer is not
included in alcohol advertising restrictions. In Denmark there is
no commercial advertising of any kind on radio or television. The
beer and wine category includes all alcoholic beverages with 23
percent or less alcohol, and spirits is everything above 23
percent. Advertising bans include both voluntary and mandatory
prohibition of all advertisements by alcohol beverage category.10
otherwise. Every country that has this ban also bans spirits
advertisements. These data come primarily from the International
Survey of Alcohol Beverage Control Polices.
The alcohol price was computed by dividing private final
alcohol expenditures by pure alcohol consumption in liters. The
data were divided by the gross domestic product deflator using 1975
as the base year. The data were converted to United States dollars
by dividing by the purchasing power parity. Alcohol expenditures,
the deflator and purchasing power parities were take from the OECD
National Accounts. Alcohol consumption data comes from the Brewers
Association of Canada.6
Real income was computed by first dividing gross domestic
product by population. This was then divided by the gross domestic
product deflator and the purchasing power parity. The data are in
thousands of U.S. dollars and come from the OECD National Accounts.
The disadvantage of an international data set is the
difficulty in measuring the other determinants of consumption that
occur across countries. For example, cultural differences, or
sentiment, may effect alcohol consumption across countries even
after observable phenomena, such as price and income, are
controlled. Unfortunately, quantitative information measuring all
the factors influencing alcohol consumption across countries does
6This price variable has two problems. First, the price
variable may be correlated with the equation error term if alcohol
consumption is measured with error. Second, changes in the
percentages of alcohol consumed in the form of beer, wine and
spirits will result in changes in the price variable even when the
underlying beverage prices are constant.11
not exist. The omission of these variables could result in biased
estimates of the effects of advertising bans.
One method of approximating the influence of omitted sentiment
is the inclusion of a dichotomous variable for countries were
alcoholic beverage production is a major industry. In these
countries attitudes towards alcohol beverages are likely to be more
favorable and consumption may be higher. The alcohol sentiment
variable was defined as equal to one for France and Italy and
otherwise equal to zero. France and Italy were chosen because per
capita alcohol production is considerably above average in both of
these countries.
A fixed effects model is a second method of approximating the
influence of omitted alcohol control policies. In a fixed effects
model a series of country dummy variables replace the independent
variables. According to Johnston (1984), this type of model can
account for differences in sentiment across countries.7
The total alcohol demand equations also includes a measure of
tourism. This variable is included because several studies have
shown that tourism has a positive influence on alcohol consumption.
Tourism is measured by the number of tourist arrivals divided by
population. The tourist data come from the UN Statistical Yearbook.
The liver cirrhosis mortality equations also includes a
measure of supply and demand for health services. This variable is
the general mortality rate. Higher general mortality rates are
See Johnson page 405.12
associated with lower equilibrium levels of health services. This
variable should have a positive relationship to cirrhosis mortality
rates. The variable is measured as total mortality from all causes
divided by population in thousands. The data come from the UN
Demographic Yearbook.
The motor vehicle fatality equations also includes a variable
for kilometers of roads. The road variable is measured in
kilometers per thousand people and is included as a measure of
distances traveled. Several studies have shown that motor vehicle
fatalities are related to distances traveled. The road kilometer
data was taken primarily from the OECD Statistical Trends in
Transport.
IV. Results
Table 2 presents a set of mean values for alcohol consumption,
liver cirrhosis mortality rates, motor vehicle fatality rates for
1970 and 1983. These means have been computed for each category of
advertising ban. The data are, respectively, for the first and last
years of the data set.
While the data in Table 2 are only descriptive, they suggest
that alcohol advertising bans can affect alcohol abuse. In 1970
two countries, and in 1983 four countries, banned all broadcast
advertisements of alcohol. This group had the lowest values for
all three measures of alcohol abuse in both time periods. In 1970,
and in 1983, seven countries banned broadcast advertisements of
spirits but allow beer and wine advertisements. For both time13
periods this group has lower values for the three measures of
alcohol abuse than those countries which have no bans on
broadcasting alcohol advertisements •8
The data in table 2 also illustrates the time trend of the
three measures of alcohol abuse.9 Per capita alcohol consumption
increased in all three advertising categories between 1970 and
1983. However, the countries with the more restrictive advertising
policies had the lowest increases in consumption. Liver cirrhosis
mortality rates did not change significantly during the sample
period. However, motor vehicle fatality rates decreased over the
sample period. The countries with the most restrictive alcohol
advertising policies had the largest decreases in motor vehicle
fatality rates.
Table 3 presents the regression results from a set of fixed
effects models. These models include only time dummy variables for
the years 1970 through 1982 and 16 country dummies. Sweden is the
omitted country. The advertising ban variables cannot be included
in these models because they are highly collinear with the country
dummies. These models cannot explicitly distinguish between the
8Between 1970 and 1983 three countries changed their laws on
broadcast advertising of alcoholic beverages. Spain changed from
having no bans to banning spirits advertisements. Finland changed
from having no bans to banning all alcohol advertisements. Norway
changed from banning only spirits to banning all broadcast alcohol
advertisements.
9This table is only illustrative of time trend because there
is no control for changes in advertising bans that occurred over
the time period. However, a regression model can make this
distinction.14
effects of alcohol advertising bans, other alcohol policies, and
alcohol sentiment.
Although any conclusions drawn from the coefficients in Table
3 must be qualified, the results reveal considerable international
variation in per capita alcohol consumption, liver cirrhosis
mortality rates and motor vehicle fatality rates. The countries in
Table 3 are grouped in accordance with their alcohol advertising
policy. Since Sweden is the omitted country, the coefficient of
each included country represents that country's level of the
dependent variable relative to Sweden. For each of the three
dependent variables, the average coefficient for the countries
which ban all broadcast advertising of alcoholic beverages is
smaller than the average for the countries with a spirits ban.
Similarly, the average coefficient for the countries with a spirits
ban is smaller than the average coefficient for the countries which
have no bans on broadcast advertising of alcohol. The mean values
are computed with the insignificant values set equal to zero and
are reported in Table 3 in the rows labeled group means. These
results again suggest that countries with more restrictive alcohol
advertising policy have lower levels of alcohol abuse.
Panel A of Table 4 presents the estimation results from
another series of fixed effects models. These fixed effects models
use only the advertising ban variables and time dummy variables.
The purpose of estimating these fixed effects models is to provide
an alternative to the independent variable specifications in Panel
B of Table 4. The first three models also include the alcohol15
sentiment variable. The coefficients of the advertising ban
variables are negative and significant in 10 out 12 cases. These
fixed effects models again suggest a negative relationship between
alcohol advertising bans and alcohol abuse.
The results from six independent variable regression models
are presented in Panel B of Table 4. Each regression model includes
the two advertising bans, price, income, equation specific control
variables, and time dummies. The first three regressions also
include the alcohol sentiment variable. Both the beer and wine
advertising ban and the spirits advertising ban have negative and
significant coefficients in the alcohol demand and motor vehicle
fatality regressions. However,in the cirrhosis mortality
regressions only the spirits ban is significant in the
specification which excludes alcohol sentinent.
The remaining independent variables in the models in panel B
of Table 4 are generally significant and conform to a priori
expectations. The real price of alcohol is negative in all models.
Price is significant in the alcohol demand and liver cirrhosis
regressions but not in the motor vehicle fatality regressions. Real
income has no a priori expectation but is positive in the alcohol
demand and motor vehicle regressions and negative in the liver
cirrhosis regressions. The real income coefficients are, however,
only marginally significant. Tourism, general mortality, and road
kilometers, with one exception, are all positive and significant
as expected.16
The first three regressions in both panels of Table 4 include
the alcohol sentiment variable. Alcohol sentiment is positive and
significant in the alcohol demand and liver cirrhosis equations.
In these two equations, the inclusion of alcohol sentiment
increases the R2 and changes the magnitude and significance of all
the independent variable coefficients. In panel A, the magnitudes
of the advertising ban variables are generally lower when alcohol
sentiment is included. In panel B, the price coefficient in the
alcohol demand equation and the liver cirrhosis equation decreases
when alcohol sentiment is included. These changes are important
because they show that when sentiment is omitted the effect of the
included policy variables may have an upward bias.
The regression results also can be used to estimate the
reduction in alcohol abuse in countries with advertising bans
relative to those without bans. Since the dependent variables are
in logarithmic form, the coefficient of an advertising ban variable
can be interpreted as the percentage change occurring when the
advertising ban variable equals one.10 The coefficients from the
independent variable models which include alcohol sentiment were
used for these estimates. These regressions were used because they
are the most inclusive specifications. The regressions indicate
that countries with bans on spirits advertising have about 10
percent lower alcohol consumption and motor vehicle fatality rates
than countries with no bans. The results also show that countries
'0These percentages were computed using the method described
by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980).17
with bans on beer and wine advertising have about 23 percent lower
alcohol consumption and motor vehicle fatality rates than countries
with only bans on spirits advertising.
The results also indicate that the three measures of alcohol
abuse have distinctly different relationships to advertising and
pricing policies and diverging time patterns. The data show that
alcohol consumption is related to advertising bans and alcohol
price. Liver cirrhosis mortality rates are less consistently
related to alcohol advertising bans, but are clearly related to
alcohol price. The data also show that motor vehicle fatality rates
are related to advertising bans but less clearly related to price.
Over the sample period per capita alcohol consumption increased
while liver cirrhosis mortality rates remained steady and motor
vehicle fatality rates fell. These results suggest that the
relationship between alcohol consumption and alcohol abuse is
dependent on other factors such as alcohol control policy.
V. Conclusions
Although there have been a number of econometric studies of
alcohol advertising policy, there are few prior studies of the
effect of a ban on broadcast advertising of alcoholic beverages.
Advertising bans are, however, a likely choice of public policy
for the control of alcohol advertising. The adoption of an
advertising ban is an infrequent event and many years following
the institution of an advertising ban are required to allow for
adjustment. This leaves data from any one country without18
sufficient empirical variation to measure the effect of a ban.
There is, however, considerable variation in the use of advertising
bans across countries. The data used in this study is, therefore,
a pooled time series for 14 years over 17 countries.
The empirical results presented in this paper indicate that
the countries which have adopted advertising bans have lower levels
of alcohol abuse. Alcohol abuse is measured by per. capita alcohol
consumption, liver cirrhosis mortality rates, and motor vehicle
fatality rates. The results show advertising bans have a
significant effect in reducing all three measures of alcohol abuse.19
Table I
* Definitionsand Means of Variables
Variable Definition and Mean
Beer and Wine A dichotomous variable which is equaltoone ifacountry
Ad Ban has a ban on broadcast advertising of beer andwineand
Is equal tozero otherwise. (Everycountry thai.hasthis
ban also bans spirits advertisements.) p=O.llt.
Spill Is A dichotomous variable which is equoltiI)II if t a:nijtut n,
Al!lit has a ban on broadcast adveti ising of spirits.bittiiIws
beerandwine advert. snrerttsand is equt II
otherwise. p0.39.
Per Capi l.a Consumption itt1 i terspercapitaof pure•r1 coituIfrom
Consumptionof beer, wine and spirits. =9.65.
Pure Alcohol
Liver Cirrhosis Annual fatalities from liver cirrhosis divided by
Mortality Rate population. p=O.OO2.
Motor Annual fatalities from motor vehicle accidents divided
Vehicle by population. p=0.0O2.
Fatality Rate
Real Price of a Total expenditure on alcoholic beverages divided by pure
Liter of Pure alcohol consumption in liters. The variable was adjusted
Alcohol by dividing by the GDP deflator and converted to U.S.
dollars by dividing by the Purchasing Power Parity.
p=13 .85
Real Income National income divided by GDP deflator and converted to
thousands of U.S. dollars by dividing by the Purchasing
PowerParity. p=5.33.
Alcohol A di chotonrousvar i ableequal to one for' France ;ttid fitI y
Sentiment .118.
Tourism Number of touristarrivals divided by popt.ilat Hill 1I).(i
General Mortality front allcauses,perthousand populitttott.
MortalityRate ij=9.92.
Road Kilometers ofroadsdivided by population. plG.50.
Kilometers
A1l data are for the 17countries for the years1970 through 1983. The 17
countriesare Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France.
Ireland,Italy, Luxembourg,Netherlands. Norway. Portugal. Spain, Sweden. the
United Kingdom, and theUnited States.20
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* Thet—ratios are in parentheses. All equations
variables for the years 1970 through 1982 and an22
Table4
Regression Results*
Alcohol Liver MotorAlcohol Liver Motor
Demand Cirrhosis Vehicle Demand Cirrhosis Vehicle
Mortality Fatality Mortality Fatality
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Panel A
Beer and Wine :388—.588 —.368 --.05—1.012-.3S0
An Ban (5.52)(3.45) (4.01)(.86) (4.31)(:.Y8}
Spirits —.146—.197 .021 -.290 —.415 .026
AdBan (5.00) (3.96) (.64) (6.93) (6.23) (.83)
Alcohol .521 .711 —.019
Sentiment (16.61) (14,63) (.54)
8—Squared .66 .59 .24 .23 .19 .23
PanelB
Beer and Wine —.403 .172 —.391 —.344 .207 —.382
AdBan (6.04) (.98) (4.26) (3.51) (.97) (4.14)
Spirits —.112 —.011 —.099 —.181 —.144 —.108
AdBan (4.04) (.18) (2.67) (4.49) (2.01) (2.94)
Real —.014 -.046 —.003 —.029 -.076 —.005
PrIce (5.92)(6.24) (.75) (8.50) (9.30) (1.47)
Real .014—.033 .019 .003 —.006 .166
Income (1.77) (1.71) (1.61) (0.27) (.25) (1.44)
Alcohol .442 .527 .063








R—Squared .79 .70 .40 .54 .56 .39
*Thet—ratios are in parentheses. All equations include dummy
variables for the years 1970 through 1982, and an intercept.23
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